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Abstract
In [N. Alon, M. Feldman, A. D. Procaccia, and M. Tennenholtz, A note on
competitive di®usion through social networks, Inform. Process. Lett. 110
(2010) 221-225], the authors introduced a game-theoretic model of di®usion
process through a network. They showed a relation between the diameter of a
given network and existence of pure Nash equilibria in the game. Theorem 1
of their paper says that a pure Nash equilibrium exists if the diameter is at
most two. However, we have an example which does not admit a pure Nash
equilibrium even if the diameter is two. Hence we correct the statement of
Theorem 1 of their paper.
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1. Introduction
In their interesting paper [1] on a competitive facility location game, Alon
et al. addressed a di®usion game on an undirected graph G = hV;Ei with
a set of players N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng. Each player i has an individual color ci,
which is neither white nor gray. In this game, initially, all vertices are colored
by white. At time one, each player i selects one vertex on a given graph, and
colors the vertex by ci. If a vertex is selected by more than two players, it is
colored by gray. At time t + 1, each white vertex is colored in ci (i 2 N), if
it is adjacent to vertices colored by ci, but is not adjacent to vertices colored
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by cj for any j 2 N n fig. A white vertex that has two neighbors colored
by two distinct colors ci and cj (i; j 2 N; i 6= j) is colored by gray. When
there is no vertex whose color is changed from white in this time, the process
terminates. A strategy pro¯le x(2 V N) stands for a vertex selected by each
player at time one. The utility of player i, denoted by Ui(x), is given by the
number of vertices colored by ci at the end of the process.
Given a strategy pro¯le x = (x1; : : : ; xn) and x
0 2 V , we denote by
(x0;x¡i) a vector equals to x but with the ith component replaced by x0,
that is, (x1; : : : ; xi¡1; x0; xi+1; : : : ; xn). A strategy pro¯le x is a pure Nash
equilibrium of this game, if Ui(x
0;x¡i) · Ui(x) holds for any i 2 N and
x0 2 V .
The paper [1] discussed a relationship between existence of pure Nash
equilibria of this game and the diameter of the given graph. The diameter of a
graph is the maximum distance between a pair of vertices. They showed that
if the diameter is at most two then a pure Nash equilibrium exists, whereas
if the diameter is greater than two then an equilibrium is not guaranteed to
exist. In this paper, we show an example which does not admit a pure Nash
equilibrium even though the diameter is two.
2. Counterexample
We have an instance which does not have a pure Nash equilibrium for two
players even though the diameter of the graph is two. For a di®usion game
induced by the graph shown in Figure 1 and two players, the utility bimatrix
is given by Table 1. From this bimatrix, we can observe the following facts:
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Figure 1: A graph that does not admit a pure Nash equilibrium for two players.
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Table 1: Utility bimatrix for the di®usion game induced by the graph in Figure 1 and two
players. Element (i; j) implies (U1(vi; vj); U2(vi; vj)).
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9
v1 (0; 0) (4; 3) (3; 4) (5; 2) (5; 2) (4; 2) (5; 2) (4; 3) (5; 1)
v2 (0; 0) (4; 3) (4; 3) (5; 1) (5; 2) (5; 2) (4; 2) (5; 2)
v3 (0; 0) (4; 2) (5; 2) (4; 3) (5; 1) (5; 2) (5; 2)
v4 (0; 0) (4; 2) (3; 3) (4; 3) (3; 3) (4; 3)
v5 (0; 0) (3; 4) (3; 3) (3; 4) (3; 3)
v6 (0; 0) (4; 2) (3; 3) (4; 3)
v7 (0; 0) (3; 4) (3; 3)
v8 (0; 0) (4; 2)
v9 (0; 0)
² For any x1 2 V and x2 2 fv4; v5; v6; v7; v8; v9g, there exists v 2 fv1; v2; v3g
such that U2(x1; x2) < U2(x1; v). Thus, any vertex in fv1; v2; v3g always
beats a vertex in fv4; v5; v6; v7; v8; v9g.
² We have U2(v1; v2) < U2(v1; v3), U2(v2; v3) < U2(v2; v1), and U2(v3; v1) <
U2(v3; v2).
Hence, we can see this game does not admit a pure Nash equilibrium.
A point to notice in this example is that the di®usion process may repeat
until time three. Let Nv be the neighborhood of vertex v including v. For
instance, we consider a strategy pro¯le x = (v1; v9). Since (Nv9 nfv9g) ½ Nv1 ,
any vertex is not colored by c2 at time two. On the other hand, v2 and v5
are colored by c1 at time two. Finally, at time three, vertices v6 and v7 are
colored by c1. In this case, the key equation in the proof of [1]
Ui(x) = jNxij ¡ j
[
j 6=i
(Nxi \Nxj)j+ ÂAi(x); (1)
where ÂAi(x) is the indicator function for Ai = fx j 9j 2 N n fig; xj 2
Nxig, does not hold for i = 1. Indeed, the right-hand-side of (1) becomes
jNv1 j¡j(Nv1\Nv9)j+ÂA1((v1; v9)) = 6¡3¡0 = 3, although U1((v1; v9)) = 5.
Eq. (1) holds when Nv [Nu = V for any pair of vertices v and u. Hence
we correct the argument of Theorem 1 in [1] as follows:
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Theorem 1. When Nu [Nv = V holds for any pair of vertices u and v, the
di®usion game with any number of players admits a pure Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, an equilibrium can be found in polynomial time.
Finally, we show another condition such that Eq. (1) holds when the
number of players is two. For a couple of pairs of vertices (v; u) and (z; w),
let Du;v(z; w) be the distance between z and w in the graph deleting (Nv \
Nu) n fu; vg. Eq. (1) holds for any x 2 V £ V , when the following condition
holds.
restricted equivalent distance condition: For any pair of vertices (v; u)
and any vertex z 2 V n (Nv [Nu), Du;v(u; z) = Du;v(v; z) holds.
This condition implies that a vertex colored at time three is colored by only
gray.
Theorem 2. When the restricted equivalent distance condition holds, the
di®usion game with two players admits a pure Nash equilibrium. Further-
more, an equilibrium can be found in polynomial time.
Note that the restricted equivalent distance condition is a necessary and
su±cient condition for Eq. (1) when there are two players. It is a future
work to show necessary conditions for Eq. (1) for any number of players.
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